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THE INFLUENCE OF ARBITRATOR BACKGROUND AND REPRESENTATION ON
ARBITRATION OUTCOMES
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, & A.C. Pritchard*
ABSTRACT
We study the role of arbitrator background in securities arbitration. We find that
arbitrator background is correlated with arbitration outcomes. Specifically, industry
experience, prior experience as a regulator, and status as a professional arbitrator are
correlated with statistically significant differences in arbitration awards. We find that the
impact of these characteristics is affected by whether the arbitrator in question serves as
the panel chair and by whether the parties to the arbitration are represented by counsel.
Our findings offer some preliminary insights into the debate over arbitrator bias. On the
one hand, they suggest that the party selection process is relatively effective in screening
for potential bias. FINRA has imposed increasingly more rigorous qualification
requirements, specifically with respect to the independence of public arbitrators, but our
study suggests that these requirements are unlikely to affect outcomes in most cases. On
the other hand, party selection appears to be most effective when the parties are
represented by counsel. Our findings highlight the importance of legal representation in
the arbitration process.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
On January 10, 2012, the Carlyle Group filed a registration statement with the

SEC in connection with an initial public offering of limited partnership interests. The
form S-1 disclosed that the partnership agreement would contain provisions requiring
investors to resolve any disputes through individual arbitration rather than litigation.
Carlyle’s filing generated a substantial and largely critical media response, with critics
arguing that Carlyle’s actions were designed to strip shareholders of important rights.1
The SEC had previously refused to allow companies to issue publicly traded securities if
they required arbitration to resolve shareholder disputes but, in the last two decades,
courts and commentators have become more receptive to arbitration as a substitute for
litigation. In addition to claiming that litigation is “spinning out of control,” defenders of
arbitration argue that it is cheaper, faster, and eliminates the lawyer-driven abuses
associated with the class action.
Carlyle retreated from its effort to test the legality of mandatory arbitration for
shareholder suits.

In the context of broker-customer disputes, however, mandatory

arbitration has long been the norm.

In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court upheld

mandatory arbitration provisions in brokerage customer agreements,2 and mandatory
arbitration has been a standard term in such agreements ever since. As a result, the

1

See, e.g., Carlyle Curbing Shareholder Rights Irritates Lawmakers Who See Precedent
By Miles Weiss - Jan 26, 2012 (quoting U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal as stating that “The SEC should
reject this effort to circumvent shareholder rights because it will be an extraordinary and enduring
precedent”).
2
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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overwhelming majority of broker-customer disputes, even those involving substantial
sums, are resolved through arbitration.3
Brokerage customer arbitration takes place largely behind the closed doors of the
Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA).4

Unlike judicial proceedings,

FINRA arbitrations are not open to the public. Although FINRA releases the written
decisions issued after arbitration hearings, it does not disclose the details of the claims
filed or background information on the arbitrators who issue these decisions. Moreover,
FINRA arbitration rules require the arbitrators to announce only bare-bones information
in their awards.5 Notably, an explanation of the reasons for the arbitrators’ decision is
not required unless such an explanation is jointly requested by all the parties.6 The result
is a process with limited transparency.
The absence of detailed case-specific information creates challenges for empirical
research, making evaluation of arbitration’s effectiveness in protecting investors’ rights
exceedingly difficult.

Nonetheless, as commentators debate the relative merits of

arbitration versus litigation, the need for tools to assess the arbitration process becomes
apparent. Significant issues remain, including the selection of arbitrators and structuring
of arbitration panels to limit the potential for bias, and improving the reliability of
arbitration awards.

3

See, e.g., STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2011)
(upholding trial court’s confirmation of $400 million arbitration award).
4
“FINRA is a private corporation that succeeded the National Association of Securities Dealers and the
enforcement divisions of the New York Stock Exchange as the self-regulatory organization for the
securities industry.” Wachovia Securities LLC v. Brand, __ F.3d __ (4th Cir. 2012). FINRA handles
arbitration of both broker-customer disputes and disputes between FINRA member firms and their
employees. This article only analyzes arbitration that result from disputes between brokers and their
customers.
5
Code of Customer Arbitration, Rule 12904 (e). Awards (designating information required in an arbitration
award).
6
Rule 12904(g) Explained Decisions.

2
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FINRA has been particularly sensitive to concerns about potential arbitrator bias.
Over the past eight years, FINRA has changed the arbitrator selection process, enhanced
the independence requirements for public arbitrators, and increased the opportunity for
customers to bring their disputes before all-public panels.
Further refinements to that process require a better understanding of the effects of
arbitrator and case-specific differences on arbitration outcomes. This project examines
one such difference – arbitrator background – as well as the effect that legal
representation has on that difference. To explore the role of arbitrator background in
securities arbitration, we analyze a dataset of randomly selected arbitration awards from
1998 to 2000. We hand collect data on particular arbitrator background characteristics –
people who serve as professional arbitrators, people with prior securities experience,
prior regulators and retired arbitrators. We explore whether the presence of arbitrators
with these characteristics affects the size of arbitration awards and the extent to which the
impact is affected by whether the arbitrator with these characteristics serves as the panel
chair. We also examine the extent to which the impact is affected by legal representation
of the parties.
We proceed as follows.

We lay out the background on the arbitrability of

securities claims, FINRA arbitration procedures and survey prior literature in Part 2. Part
3 sets forth our hypotheses. Part 4 describes our sample and variables, and reports the
results of our empirical tests. Part 5 concludes.

2.

BACKGROUND

2.1. Legal Status of Customer Arbitration

3

At one time, the Supreme Court was suspicious of contracts that required
customers to submit disputes to arbitration. In Wilko v. Swan,7 the Supreme Court held
that suits under the Securities Act of 1933 were not subject to mandatory arbitration. As
the Court later explained, Wilko “reflect[ed] a general suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and the competence of arbitral tribunals.”8 Many lower courts, applying
similar reasoning, extended Wilko to other securities claims, including litigation pursuant
to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.9
In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court reversed its position. In Shearson/American
Express v. McMahon, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act reflected a "federal
policy favoring arbitration."10 Specifically, the Court held that arbitral forums were fully
capable of resolving securities fraud disputes11 and that the “the mistrust of arbitration
that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the
assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time.”12

Two years later, in

Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Supreme Court explicitly
overruled Wilko and held that pre-dispute arbitration agreement would be upheld, even
with respect to claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933.13 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court has emphasized its approval of arbitration as an alternative to litigation,

7

346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
9
See, e.g., Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (CA2), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
10
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226, quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
11
The Court based its holding, in part, on the fact that “the Commission has broad authority to oversee and
to regulate the rules adopted by the SROs relating to customer disputes, including the power to mandate the
adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory
rights.” 482 U.S. at 233-34. The extent to which the SEC has exercised that authority to oversee the
fairness of customer arbitration procedures is unclear.
12
482 U.S. at 233.
13
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
8
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stating that arbitration produces “lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability
to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”14
The Supreme Court’s expansive reading of the FAA and its approval of
alternative dispute resolution have resulted in a deferential approach to judicial review of
arbitration awards. Under the Court’s interpretation of the FAA, courts are not permitted
to overturn arbitration awards on the basis that the arbitrators misinterpreted or applied
applicable law.15

Although traditionally the courts have granted motions to vacate

arbitration awards in which the arbitrators were found to have manifestly disregarded the
law, the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions on the doctrine of “manifest disregard”
suggest that this language is merely a “judicial gloss” on the explicit statutory grounds for
vacatur set out in the FAA.16 Lower courts have read this Supreme Court precedent as
holding that the statutory grounds for vacating or modifying an arbitration award are
exclusive.17
These legal standards limit the extent to which courts can exercise effective
oversight over the potential for bias in arbitration procedures. Under § 10(a) of the FAA,
a court can vacate a decision on the basis of “evident partiality” or “other misbehavior”
14

559 U.S., at ___, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776). See also Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581
(2008) (stating that the FAA reflects a “comprehensive scheme to replace judicial hostility to arbitration
with a national policy favoring it.”). The Court recently held that California’s prohibition of class action
waivers was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2010).
15
See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
16
The primary such authority is contained in FAA § 10(a)(3) which allows courts to vacate arbitration
awards only "where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights arbitral proceedings is itself desirable,
reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution." See Stolt-Nielsen at n. 3 (“We do not
decide whether “‘manifest disregard’” survives our decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008), as an independent ground for review or
as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10”)
17
See, e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009); Frazier v.
CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the common law standards for
vacatur are, therefore, no longer valid).
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of the arbitrators.18 Courts have interpreted evident partiality as involving a relationship
with an arbitrator, a lawyer or a party19 rather than an arbitrator’s predisposition or
general views about the law or the industry.20 In addition, courts have rejected the
argument that an arbitrator’s position or experience within the industry is sufficient to
meet the legal standard of bias,21 even if that position might present the appearance of
bias.22 Moreover, to the extent that the arbitrators disclose any potential biases or
conflicts, or relationships that create the potential for bias, such disclosure insulates the
award from subsequent challenge in that a party can respond to the disclosure by striking
the arbitrator or seeking his or her removal from the panel.23
2.2 FINRA Procedures
Arbitrators in FINRA customer arbitrations are chosen through a party selection
system. In 1999-2000, the time period from which our sample is chosen, customer
claims for more than $50,000 were resolved by a three-arbitrator panels.24 FINRA rules
specified that the panels were to consist of two “public” arbitrators and one “industry”
arbitrator. FINRA does not impose limits on the background of industry arbitrators, and
they generally include current and former brokers, bankers and other professionals in the

18

Cite statute and STMicroelectronics.
STMicroelectronics at 74. See Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d
278 (analyzing nature of relationships that might require vacatur of arbitration award for partiality).
20
See, e.g., Repub. Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 153 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2002)
(“A judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been thought a
necessary component of equal justice ….”).
21
See also Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278 (noting that “the
best lawyers and professionals . . . normally have the longest lists of potential connections to disclose”).
22
STMicroelectronics. See also Owen-Williams v. BB&T Inv. Servs., 717 F. Supp. 2d 1 (DDC 2010)
(citations omitted) (”'It is well established that a mere appearance of bias is insufficient to demonstrate
evident partiality."”).
23
See, e.g., Cortina v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92954, 17-18 (S.D. Cal. Aug.
19, 2011) (“Because the arbitrator disclosed prior to the hearing the facts Petitioner contends give the
impression of bias, his request to vacate the award based on non-disclosure is denied.”).
24
FINRA has now raised this limit to $100,000. FINRA Regulatory Notice 09-13 (2009).
19
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securities industry.25 Public arbitrators, also known as “neutrals” are supposed to lack
substantial industry ties, and FINRA rules disqualify various professionals from serving
as public arbitrators on the basis of ties that include current and former employment
relationships, a close relative who works in the securities industry, and, for lawyers,
substantial representation of industry clients. 26
Since November 1998, arbitrators for FINRA arbitrations have been chosen
through a list selection system administered by the Director of Dispute Resolution,
termed the Neutral List Selection System (or NLSS).27 During most of the time period
involved in our study, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)28 provided
the parties in each case with two separate lists, one consisting of public arbitrators and the
other consisting of non-public arbitrators, in a roughly two-to-one ratio.29 The lists were
generated by an NASD computer program using a rotational method, although the
computer eliminated arbitrators with obvious conflicts of interest. Along with the lists,
the parties were also provided with background information on each arbitrator, including

25

FINRA Rule 10308. Selection of Arbitrators, (4) “non-public arbitrator”
FINRA Rule 10308. Selection of Arbitrators, (5) “public arbitrator.” See also SEC, Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change to Amend the Definition of Public Arbitrator, Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 54792
(March 19, 2008).
27
The NASD’s Neutral List Selection System (NLSS) went into effect on November 17, 1998. The NLSS
was proposed by the NASD Arbitration Policy Task Force as part of its 1996 Securities Arbitration Reform
Report and modeled after the list selection system used by the American Arbitration Association. The
report recommended that panels for larger cases continue to be composed of one industry member and two
public arbitrators. The report recommended improving the quality of arbitrators by increased arbitrator
compensation, better training, expanding the arbitrator pool and requiring arbitrator evaluation of copanelists. The report also made some highly controversial recommendations concerning the availability of
punitive damages in arbitration awards.
28
The NASD was the predecessor to FINRA. Prior to the merger, approximately 90% of securities
arbitrations were handled by the NASD; the remainder were arbitrated through the New York Stock
Exchange arbitration program.
29
Under FINRA’s current selection procedure, FINRA provides the parties in a customer dispute with three
sets of names. One set is a list of potential public arbitrators, the second is a list of industry arbitrators, and
the third is a list of chair-eligible arbitrators.
26
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a copy of that arbitrator’s Arbitrator Disclosure Report.30 FINRA rules then allowed
parties to strike, without cause, prospective panelists until they reached agreement on a
panel.
The position of panel chair has received particular attention. The chair exercises
greater control over the arbitration process than the other panelists, often being the one to
decide motions, discovery issues, evidentiary questions, etc.31 FINRA itself has stated
that “chairpersons . . . play a vital role in the administration of cases.”32 At the time of
our study, arbitration chairs were merely required to qualify as public arbitrators.33
FINRA has subsequently tightened its requirements for an arbitrator to qualify to serve as
a panel chair.34
An ongoing issue in FINRA arbitrations concerns the appropriate extent to which
arbitrators should have securities industry background.

On the one hand, more

knowledgeable arbitrators are likely to produce more accurate awards. Broker-customer
disputes frequently involve technical issues in which familiarity with industry practices is
valuable. Securities expertise enables an arbitrator to understand the nature of the claims
better.35 As some courts have noted, “[t]he most sought-after" arbitrators “are those who
are prominent and experienced members of the specific business community in which the

30

See STMicroelectronics (describing selection process and disclosure Arbitrator Disclosure Reports).
Parties were allowed to request additional information on the arbitrators, and the NASD director was
required to forward that request to the arbitrators, although the arbitrators were not required to respond.
31
See Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Thereto To Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for
Customer Disputes, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 51856 (June 15, 2005), 70 FR 36442, 36445 (June 23, 2005).
32
Id.
33
Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra at _ (explaining that FINRA would designate as chair the public arbitrator
that received the higher combined ranking from the parties).
34
Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Thereto To Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for
Customer Disputes, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 51856 (June 15, 2005), 70 FR 36442, 36445 (June 23, 2005).
35
See Bondi (defending expertise of FINRA arbitrators).
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dispute to be arbitrated arose.”36 On the other hand, an arbitrator’s connections to the
industry – those same connections that may furnish expertise – may also lead to claims
that the arbitrator is biased.37 Of particular concern is the possibility that arbitrators with
industry ties will be predisposed against claimants. FINRA has recently responded to
these concerns by offering parties in customer arbitrations the option of all-public
panels.38
2.2.

Prior Literature
The literature evaluating the relative merits of arbitration versus litigation is

extensive. Many commentators argue that arbitration provides faster dispute resolution at
a lower cost than litigation. Some commentators have specifically advocated substitution
of arbitration for litigation in an increasing range of securities disputes, along the lines of
the Carlyle proposal.39
The extent to which arbitration raises fairness considerations, particularly in cases
between a retail investor or consumer and a business defendant, has been widely debated.
Several empirical studies have examined arbitration results in the consumer and
employment context.40

In addition, a few articles specifically study the FINRA

arbitration process.41 Among the challenges faced by these studies is the absence of a

36

International Produce v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1981).
FINRA has imposed increasing restrictions on the extent to which public arbitrators can have ties to the
securities industry.
38
See STMicroelectronics at n.5 (describing concerns about pro-industry bias and FINRA’s response of
offering all-public panels). Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.;
Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule
Change Relating to Amendments to the Panel Composition Rule, and Related Rules, of the Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (offering customers the option to choose an all-public panel
in all cases).
39
See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery & Sustainable Growth Through Reform of
the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigation, 33 Harv. J. L. &
Pub. Pol'y 607, 630-31 (2010).
40
Cite to our prior paper (summarizing the literature).
41
Id.
37
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baseline. Arbitration decisions rarely report details of the underlying claim, providing
researchers with little basis for assessing case merits.42 As a result, the studies rely
largely on survey data examining the extent to which arbitration participants report
satisfaction with the system.43
Two recent studies report a trend toward less favorable decisions for claimants.
Kondo finds that, since the adoption of the party selection by FINRA, selection of proindustry arbitrators has increased, and selection of arbitrators based on their expertise has
declined.44

Schultz finds a declining trend in the frequency with which customers

prevail.45 On the other hand, Choi and Eisenberg find that arbitrators award punitive
damages in a non-trivial percentage of cases, and that such awards appear to be correlated
both with compensatory damages and more serious allegations of misconduct.46
To the extent that a trend against claimants exists, it may be due to the advantage
that brokerage firms have, as repeat players, in securities arbitrations.47 This advantage
includes both the ability to screen potential arbitrators effectively and the ability to
discipline arbitrators who rule against defendants by refusing to select them in subsequent

42

Arbitrators are not required by FINRA rules to provide an explanation of the basis for their award unless
such an explanation is requested by all the parties. SEC Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To
Require Arbitrators To Provide an Explained Decision, Securities Act Release No. 59358, 74 Fed. Reg.
6928 (Feb. 11, 2009). Notably, arbitrators adhere to the conventional silence even in large cases involving
institutional claimants. See, e.g., ST Microelectronics v. Credit Suisse, 2009 FINRA Arb. LEXIS 112
(omitting any explanation of the basis for $431 million award, the largest in the history of FINRA
arbitration).
43
See, e.g., Jill Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of
Investors' Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp. Resol. 349 (2008).
44
Kondo, Jiro E. 2009. The Self-Regulation of Enforcement: Evidence from Investor-Broker Disputes at
the NASD. Working paper. Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, Ill.
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/kondo/public/k1_paper_f09.pdf.
45
Schultz, Lawrence S. 2008. Storm Clouds in Arbitration. Pp. 351-93 in Securities Arbitration 2008:
Evolving and Improving, edited by David E. Robbins. New York: Practising Law Institute.
46
Choi and Eisenberg, 39 J. Legal Stud. 497
47
Colvin, 8 J. Emp. Leg. Stud. 1 (2011) (reporting strong evidence of repeat player advantage in
employment arbitration) .
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cases.48

Klement and Neeman model the potential that arbitrators will bias their

decisions in a private party selection system in order to increase the likelihood that they
will be selected in the future.49 We explore this possibility below.
Congress has considered statutory changes to restrict the use of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses.

In the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, Congress

considered banning pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate various types of customer and
employment disputes.50

Although the language was unclear, some commentators

suggested that it would have covered customer securities claims.51 More recently, the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 authorizes (but does not require) the Securities and Exchange
Commission to limit or prohibit agreements requiring customers of any broker or dealer
to arbitrate future disputes arising under federal securities laws.52 Some commentators
have warned that such action would harm retail investors because of the limited private
judicial remedies provided by federal law in broker-customer disputes.53
3.

HYPOTHESES
H1: Arbitrators with connections to the securities industry will
make smaller awards. This effect will disappear if the claimant is
represented by counsel.

H2: Professional arbitrators will make smaller awards. This effect
will disappear if the claimant represented by counsel.

48

Public Citizen, The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers (Sept. 2007),
available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7545.
49
Klement, Alon and Neeman, Zvika, Private Selection and Arbitrator Impartiality (March 31, 2011).
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800026 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1800026
50
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
51
See Bondi at 634.
52
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010).
53
See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 13 Univ. Penn. J. Bus. L. 101 (2010).
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H3: Retired arbitrators will make smaller awards. This effect will
disappear if the claimant represented by counsel.
H4: Arbitrators with prior experience as regulators will make
larger awards. This effect will disappear if the respondent is
represented by counsel.

4.

EMPIRICAL TESTS

4.1

Description of Dataset
We obtained NASD arbitration awards from the FINRA arbitration awards online

site and from the LEXIS database. To generate a random set of arbitrators, we randomly
selected 417 arbitration awards involving investor claimants for the years 1998 to 2000.
We limited our sample to arbitration decisions that followed a hearing54 and to those that
involve three-person panels as opposed to a single arbitrator.

We only look at

arbitrations where the chair and one panel arbitrator are public arbitrators and the other
panel arbitrator is an industry arbitrator. The decisions identify the members of the panel
as well as indicating the arbitrator who serves as the chair of the panel.55
We then collected data on the background of each of the arbitrators in our sample
from the arbitrator disclosure reports that we were able to obtain, which we supplemented
with information from public sources such as the internet. We were able to obtain
background data on approximately two-thirds of the arbitrators appearing in our
arbitration sample. Table 1 reports the number of arbitration awards in our sample by
year.
<<Insert Table 1 About Here>>
54

A substantial percentage of arbitration claims are settled or resolved on the papers without a live hearing.
Because of FINRA’s selection procedures at the time of our study, the chairs are almost all public
arbitrators. We excluded arbitrations with non-public chairs from the sample.

55
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4.2

Variable Description
The dependent variable for our tests is the Compensation Ratio, defined as the

compensatory award (or settlement if reported) divided by the requested compensation
amount.56 One potential weakness in this measure is that the claimant decides how much
to request as compensation, which creates room for exaggeration. Claimants may request
punitive or exemplary damages as well as damages for pain and suffering. However,
these are listed separately in the arbitration award which allows us to exclude them from
our measure of the compensatory damages. The compensatory damages will typically
turn on the number of securities involved in a particular transaction multiplied by the
losses the investor-claimant incurred on the securities.

Because information on the

quantity of securities traded (as well as the increase or decline in share price) is also
available to the broker or brokerage firm respondent, claimants’ discretion with respect to
the amount sought as compensation is limited by the arbitration process.
A number of factors may affect the Compensation Ratio. To control for these
factors, our models include a number of variables relating to representation, the subject
matter of the dispute, selection of the dispute for arbitrator resolution, award, and state in
which the arbitration occurred. A list of the variable definitions is provided in Table A1.
<<Insert Table 2 About Here>>
To control for the strength of the presentation of the case, we add indicator
variables coded as 1 if the claimant is represented by counsel (Claimant Attorney) or the
respondent is represented by counsel (Respondent Attorney), respectively, and 0
56

We use Compensation Ratio rather than the absolute level of compensation awarded as our dependent
variable because we lack data on the actual damages suffered by the claimants. Using the ratio rather than
the raw figure mitigates the omitted variable problem.

13

otherwise. Better representation may lead to better outcomes. These variables may also
correlate with case strength – claimants with strong cases are more likely to be able to
attract an attorney to work on a contingency fee basis, while respondents with no
defenses may not bother to hire counsel. In addition, the presence of an attorney may
have an effect on panel selection, a topic which we explore further in our empirical tests
below. Claimants were represented by counsel in 87% of the cases; respondents 82%.
Subject matter controls include indicator variables for six common areas of
arbitration. Suitability is defined to equal 1 if the arbitration involved a suitability claim,
including claims relating to “know your customer,” NYSE Rule 405,57 and NASD Rule
2310 issues,58 and 0 otherwise. Other subject matter indicator variables include Churning
(a churning, excessive trading, or excessive commission claim), Unauthorized Trades,
Failure to Execute (a failure to buy or sell as directed), Misrepresentation, and
Conversion (a claim of theft, conversion, unauthorized withdrawals, or self-dealing). The
base category consists of claims involving a non-specified breach of contract or violation
of fiduciary duty. Table 2 reports on the frequency of the subject matter claims in our
arbitration sample. Misrepresentation (72%) and suitability (47%) claims are the most
common.
We also include controls to address selection effects. Table 2 reports on the
settlements in our sample. The vast majority of settlements are unreported; our sample
includes a small number of settlements that are reported – typically because only some of

57

NYSE Rule 405, the “know your customer” rule, requires member firms to use “due diligence to learn
the essential facts relative to every customer [and] every order.” NYSE Rule 405.
58
NASD Rule 2310, the “suitability requirement,” states that “In recommending to a customer the
purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such
customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.”
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the respondents have settled.59 In those cases, the reported decision may or may not
report the settlement terms. The variable Reported Settlement is defined to equal 1 where
the arbitration resulted in a full or partial settlement and the settlement amount was
reported as part of the arbitration award (and included therefore in the Compensation
Ratio variable) and 0 otherwise. Unreported Partial Settlement is defined to equal 1
where the arbitration resulted in an unreported partial settlement and the award (if any)
against the remaining non-settling respondents was reported and 0 otherwise. We expect
that awards in the case of an Unreported Partial Settlement should be lower due to the
settlement by a subset of the respondents. On the other hand, the partial settlement may
correlate with the strength of the case.
Table 2 also provides summary statistics on our opinion controls.

Opinion

controls focus on characteristics of the claim that may affect the Compensation Ratio.
Claimed Compensation is included because the absolute level of compensation requested
may affect the Compensation Ratio awarded. Arbitrators may be less willing to grant a
higher Compensation Ratio for larger Claimed Compensation amounts, all other things
being equal, simply because they are reluctant to award large sums.60 Large claims are
more likely to be inflated by the claimant than small ones. Moreover, arbitrators may
perceive a large award against an individual broker or small firm as posing a risk of
insolvency.

A Compensation Ratio of 20% for a $100,000 claim produces only a

$20,000 award – the same Compensation Ratio for a claim of $100 million is likely to be
more difficult to obtain. The mean Claimed Compensation for our sample is $291,000,
59

The strength of cases that settle may be different from those that do not settle. Moreover, the claimants
who settle are arguably more risk averse than those that do not, which may affect their investment decisions
as well.
60
We should note that this concern appears to be mitigated in more recent arbitrations. See newspaper
article talking about the increasing size of arbitration awards.
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but the median is a much more modest $90,000. The Compensation Ratio is less skewed,
with a mean award of 38% of the claim and a median of 22%. To account for possible
non-linearity

in

the

relationship

between

Compensation

Ratio

and

Claimed

Compensation, we also include a squared term for Claimed Compensation.
We include a control variable for arbitrator experience, Inexperienced, set to one
if the award is from the first year that the arbitrator appeared in the dataset, and zero
otherwise. Arbitrators new to the job may be reluctant to make large awards because it
may reduce their chances for future selection by brokerage firms and their attorneys – the
repeat players in securities arbitrations.
As an additional control, we include Top Accused Brokerage set to 1 if any of the
respondents was one of the top 10 brokerage firms as of 1998 (Securities Industry
Association 1998). A large brokerage firm may have repeat player advantages and
greater resources in defending those complaints, leading to lower awards.
Several opinion controls deal with the strength of the case; stronger cases should
result in a higher Compensation Ratio. Unfortunately, we have no direct measure of the
strength of the claimant’s case, so we rely on three proxies. First, Respondent Failed to
Appear is defined to equal 1 if the any of the respondents failed to appear at the
arbitration hearing and 0 otherwise. Respondents may not appear if their case is weak;
alternatively, failing to appear itself may lead the arbitrators to view the respondents’
case as less meritorious. In most cases a default award will be entered against the nonresponding party; query how successful claimants are in collecting on such awards. At
least one respondent failed to appear in 23% of the awards in our sample.
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Second, we use a request of punitive damages by the claimant (Claimed Punitive
Damages) as a proxy for a relatively strong case. Although punitive damages can be (and
are) claimed in connection with each of the claim types in our classification, we
hypothesize that claimants request punitive damages in cases involving more egregious
wrongdoing or where they have hard evidence of fraud or other culpable misconduct.
Many awards request an unspecified amount of punitive damages. This measure may be
relatively noisy, as some lawyers will request punitive damages in every case, while
others never do. We defined Claimed Punitive Damages as equal to 1, however, only
when the claimant has made the punitive damages claim with some specificity. Two
situations fall within this definition: (a) where we observe the claimant requests a positive
dollar amount of punitive damages – fixing in the arbitrator’s minds a precise amount of
punitive damages and (b) where we observe the actual award of punitive damages,
indicating that the claimant took actions during the arbitration hearings to press their
claim for punitive damages.
Third, our last proxy for the strength of the case, Claimed CRD Expungement, is
equal to 1 if the respondents requested that the Central Registration Depository (CRD)
record of any of the respondent-brokers be expunged and 0 otherwise. FINRA maintains
CRD records for active brokers reflecting customer complaints and disciplinary
proceedings.61 Arbitrators may, at their discretion, choose to expunge the arbitration
claim from the CRD records for a broker involved in arbitration; expungement has the
effect of erasing the record of the claim from the broker’s CRD file.

61

See, e.g., Protect Your Money: Check Out Brokers and Investment Advisers, Securities & Exchange
Commission, http://www.sec.gov/investor/brokers.htm (describing CRD database).
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Although NASD rules adopted in 2004 provide that arbitrators may only grant
expungement requests under specific conditions,62 a recent PIABA study found that
expungement remains common (Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association 2007).63
We treat a respondent as requesting CRD expungement: (a) where we observe the
respondent requesting the expungement in the award summary and (b) where we observe
the actual award of CRD expungement, indicating that the respondent actively pursued
expungement during the arbitration hearings. We treat a request for CRD expungement
as an indication that the respondents’ case was stronger relative to the claimants’ case.
We consider this proxy to be the noisiest of the three case strength proxies in light of the
consistent criticisms leveled at arbitration panels for awarding expungement without an
adequate basis.
We include in our opinion controls the number of hearings in the arbitration as a
measure of the complexity of the arbitration (Number of Hearings). We also include the
length of the arbitration opinion as another measure of case complexity (Opinion
Length). Finally, our models include state controls for the state in which the arbitration
hearing took place, which we treat as exogenous to the variables in our dataset. We
include indicator variables for the three states with the most arbitrations (New York,
California, Florida).
4.3.

Industry Experience

62

In 1999, the NASD temporarily halted expungement by arbitrators after complaints were raised. In 2004,
it adopted new rules providing that arbitrators could expunge a broker’s record only if “arbitration panel
found that an investor’s allegations had been factually impossible or false, or that the accused broker had
not been individually involved in the matter.” FINRA Rule 2130.
63
The New York Times reported that, in 2005, FINRA expunged 907 customer complaints from brokers’
records, or 13% (Browning 2005).
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As discussed in Section 2, FINRA procedures during our sample period allowed
arbitrators with connections to the securities industry to serve as public arbitrators.
Individuals who might, under current rules, have been treated as industry arbitrators were
treated as public arbitrators either because their work for the securities industry fell below
a certain minimum threshold of their overall business, or because they had retired from
the industry and more than three years had elapsed since their retirement. Of course,
their service as public arbitrator was limited because the arbitrator disclosure forms
required the disclosure of industry experience and parties could, on the basis of that
experience, strike them from the list.

FINRA’s definition of public arbitrator has

subsequently been tightened to make it harder for persons associated at any time with the
securities industry to serve as public arbitrators.
In contrast, many arbitrators’ professional backgrounds revealed substantial
industry experience that did not reflect ties to the brokerage industry. Examples include
attorneys engaged in transactional securities work, attorneys who primarily represented
investors, academics and regulators. These other sources of securities experience are
unlikely to be correlated with significant industry bias. Indeed, to the extent that these
arbitrators engage in work on behalf of investors, their predisposition may be procustomer rather than pro-industry.64
Because securities experience can lead arbitrators to be predisposed toward either
the industry or the investor-claimants but may, at the same time, lead an arbitrator to a
more sophisticated understanding of the issues involved in the case, it is difficult to
determine the significance of differences in arbitration awards issued by panels that

64

See, e.g., STMicroelectronics (evaluating argument that arbitrator, because of his substantial expert and
consultant work on behalf of claimants was likely to be biased against Credit Suisse).
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reflect greater securities experience. Our first test attempts to disaggregate these effects
by focusing on industry connections.
We create an indicator variable, Securities Experience, which is set equal to 1 if
the arbitrator was primarily employed in the securities industry during the course of his or
her career, or if the individual has done work for firms in the securities industry in the
five years prior to the arbitration, regardless of the amount; if not, the variable equals
zero. Table 3 reports the incidence of securities experience among the public arbitrators
in our sample. We classify the arbitrators according to their position on the panel,
distinguishing the public arbitrators selected to be the arbitration Chair from those
serving in the second Panel position.
<<Insert Table 3 About Here>>
The incidence of connections to the securities industry is surprisingly high.
Recall that the connections are disclosed on the arbitrator’s disclosure form and
arbitrators can be struck for any reason. Nonetheless, twenty percent of the arbitrators
serving as chairs had some connection to the industry, along with 19% of the arbitrators
serving in the panel position.
To test the importance of the public arbitrators’ connections to the securities
industry, we estimate the following equation for each award using ordinary least squares
and robust standard errors clustered by arbitrator:
Compensation Ratioi = α + ß1iSecurities_Industry_Chairi +
+ ß2iSecurities_Industry_Paneli + ß3iClaimant Attorneyi
+ ß4iRespondent Attorneyi + ∑ßji Subject Matterji
Controlski + ∑ßliState Controlsli + Year Effects + εi
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+ ∑ßkiOpinion

Model 1 of Table 4 reports our results (using an ordinary least squares model with errors
clustered by individual arbitrator).
<<Insert Table 4 About Here>>
We find that the coefficients for Securities Industry Chair and Securities Industry
Panel, are both negative, but neither is significant. This finding does not support the
hypothesis that panels with public arbitrators who have connections to the securities
industry tend to provide lower awards. In Model 2, we examine arbitrations in which
both public arbitrators have connections to the industry. Not surprisingly, the coefficient
for Securities Experience Both is negative, but insignificant, presumably due to the small
number of observations.
The conflict of interest presented by affiliation with the securities industry seems
rather obvious, but the results in Model 1 suggest that it may not have much on influence
on outcomes. Nonetheless, given the role that the parties play in arbitrator selection,
when would a claimant ever allow an arbitrator affiliated with the industry to serve as a
public arbitrator on their panel? We hypothesize that counsel may play an important role
in the process by which panels are selected. To assess this possibility, we estimate the
model again, this time adding interaction variables for Securities Experience Chair x
Claimant Attorney and Securities Experience Panel x Claimant Attorney. The interaction
variables allow us to assess separately the effect of connection to the securities industry
on claimants who are represented by counsel and those who are unrepresented. We
present the results in Model 3 of Table 4.65

65

The small number of observations did not allow us estimate a model interacting Securities Experience
Both with Claimant Attorney. The same problem precluded us from estimating a similar model in the
analyses presented below.
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The results strongly support the hypothesis that unrepresented claimants face the
greatest reduction in awards when public arbitrators have connections to the securities
industry.

The Securities Experience Panel coefficient captures the effect of this

characteristic on claimants who are unrepresented.

It is negative in Model 3 with

considerably greater magnitude than in Model 1. Moreover, the coefficient estimate is
significant at the one percent level. The coefficient for the interaction variable Securities
Experience Panel x Claimant Attorney, when summed with Securities Experience Panel,
captures the effect of this characteristic on claimants who have representation. This
coefficient is positive and significant and the sum of the two is not significantly different
from zero. This finding suggests that lawyers play an important role in screening out
even obvious conflicts of interest. Conversely, unrepresented claimants appear to be at a
disadvantage in protecting themselves against conflicts of interest.66

4.4.

Professional Arbitrators

The results presented in Table 4 suggest that arbitrators with connections to the
securities industry tend to make lower awards. The effect of that conflict of interest is
essentially eliminated, however, when claimants are represented by counsel. What about

66

We also looked at whether the Chair or Panel arbitrator was working in a securities firm or as a banker at
the time of the arbitration (Profession Securities-Banker). We re-estimated Model 3 of Table 4 replacing
Securities Experience Chair and Securities Experience Panel and their interaction terms with corresponding
variables for Profession Securities-Banker Chair and Profession Securities-Banker Panel. Unreported, the
coefficient on Profession Securities-Banker Chair and Profession Securities-Banker Panel are negative,
similar with Model 3, but only Profession Securities-Banker Chair is significant (at the 1% level). The
interaction terms with Claimant Attorney are positive, similar with Model 3 of Table 4, but not
significantly different from zero. The sum of Profession Securities-Banker Chair and the Profession
Securities-Banker Chair x Claimant Attorney is negative and significant at the 10% level. The sum of
Profession Securities-Banker Panel and the Profession Securities-Banker Panel x Claimant Attorney is not
significantly different from zero. While a Claimant Attorney can mitigate the impact of an arbitrator (this
time the Chair) that works in the securities industry or as a banker, the overall effect as indicated by the
sum of Profession Securities-Banker Chair and the Profession Securities-Banker Chair x Claimant Attorney
is negative.
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less obvious conflicts of interest? Do they influence awards? If so, is that influence
ameliorated by the presence of counsel?
Some research has questioned the effect of arbitrator incentives, in particular, the
desire to be selected as an arbitrator in future cases. Kerment and Neeman, for example,
hypothesize that arbitrators consider the perception of future parties in determining their
awards. If arbitrators care about their selection in future cases, this effect is likely to be
greatest for professional arbitrators – those who devote substantially all of their time to
serving as arbitrators. In contrast, arbitrators whose primary vocation is not dispute
resolution and who serve as arbitrators only occasionally are less likely to be influenced
by the concern that their decisions will affect their likelihood in future cases.
The effect of these incentives may skew arbitration awards in favor of industry
parties. In particular, arbitrators may rationally view securities firms (but not investors)
as repeat players in securities arbitration. If an arbitrator wishes to appear attractive to
securities firms, he or she may vote for lower awards in an effort to generate future work.
This effect is potentially important in that a substantial percentage of our pool of
arbitrators consists of professional arbitrators.

They constitute 35% of the chairs,

arguably the most influential position, and 25% of the other public arbitrators.
We therefore design our second test to examine whether professional arbitrators
behave differently from other arbitrators. To assess this possibility, we create an indicator
variable, Professional Arbitrator, coded to equal one if the arbitrator devotes substantially
all of their professional time to arbitration and mediation or is described as selfemployed, and zero otherwise. Table 5 reports the incidence of professional arbitrators
among the public arbitrators in our sample.
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<<Insert Table 5 About Here>>
We estimate the following equation for each award using ordinary least squares
and robust standard errors clustered by arbitrator:
Compensation Ratioi = α + ß1iProfessional_Arbitrator_Chairi
+ ß2iProfessional_Arbitrator_Paneli + ß3iClaimant Attorneyi
+ ß4iRespondent Attorneyi + ∑ßji Subject Matterji +
∑ßkiOpinion Controlski + ∑ßliState Controlsli + Year Effects + εi
Model 1 of Table 6 reports our results.
<<Insert Table 6 About Here>>
The coefficient for Professional Arbitrator Chair is positive, but insignificant.
Recall that the parties generally must agree on this position.

The coefficient for

Professional Arbitrator Panel, however, is negative and significant at the five percent
level. These results suggest that professional arbitrators are inclined to make smaller
awards, but only when they are serving as the second public arbitrator, not the chair.
These differing results based on the position of the professional arbitrator suggest that
this potential conflict of interest is a more subtle one. How does the effect interact with
the presence of an attorney for the claimant?
To assess this possibility, we reestimate the model above adding interaction
variables for Claimant Attorney and the two Professional Arbitrator variables.
present the results of this regression in Model 2 to Table 6.

We

The coefficient for

Professional Arbitrator Panel is negative in this model and larger in magnitude, albeit
insignificant.

The coefficient for the interaction variable is positive, although also

insignificant.

These results are consistent with attorneys ameliorating the potential

conflict of interest created by an arbitrator’s potential desire to trim awards to encourage
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future selection, but the separation is less clear than with the connections to the securities
industry.

4.5.

Retired Arbitrators

Another category of public arbitrators who may be anxious to be selected as
arbitrators would be individuals who have retired from full-time work. In addition to
having a lower opportunity cost for their time, anecdotal evidence from our conversations
with retired arbitrators suggested that serving as an arbitrator was an interesting diversion
that got them out of the house. A willingness to serve would give retired arbitrators an
incentive similar to that of professional arbitrators to curry favor with brokerage firms,
the repeat players in this process. Alternatively, some attorneys suggested to us that older
arbitrators may be more conservative, and therefore reluctant to make large awards. Both
of these factors suggest that older arbitrators would tend to make lower awards. Retired
and older arbitrators make up a significant portion of the public arbitrators in our sample.
Retired chairs make up nearly a third of the sample, and over half of the arbitrators
occupying the second public arbitrator position.
To assess the effect of retired arbitrators on the level of awards, we create an
indicator variable set equal to one if the arbitrator was retired at the time of the
arbitration, or over the age of 65, and zero otherwise. Obviously, some of the arbitrators
in our sample were continuing to work after age of 65, but our investigation suggested
that many of the arbitrators above age 65 were not working full time at that point, even if
they were not fully retired. Arbitrators who were only working part time presumably had
time available to take on more arbitration work. Insofar as our coding treats some
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arbitrators who are working full time as retired, it should bias against any significant
finding.
<<Insert Table 7 About Here>>
We estimate the following equation for each award using ordinary least squares
and robust standard errors clustered by arbitrator:
Compensation Ratioi = α + ß1iRetired_Chairi + ß2iRetired_Paneli + ß3iClaimant
Attorneyi + ß4iRespondent Attorneyi + ∑ßji Subject Matterji + ∑ßkiOpinion
Controlski + ∑ßliState Controlsli + Year Effects + εi
We present the results in Table 8.
<<Insert Table 8 About Here>>
For retired arbitrators, the chair position appears to be relevant. The coefficient
for Retired Arbitrator Chair is negative and significant at the ten percent level, while the
coefficient for Retired Arbitrator Panel is insignificant. When we focus in Model 2 on
arbitrations for which both public arbitrators are retired, the coefficient for that variable is
negative and significant at the ten percent level. Examining the interaction between
retired arbitrators and the presence of a claimant attorney, the coefficient for Retired
Arbitrator Chair is positive in this specification, albeit insignificant, suggesting that
claimants who are not represented by counsel do not face any disadvantage when there is
a retired chair.

The coefficient for the interaction variable is negative, but it is

insignificant and the sum of the two coefficients is also insignificant, so we cannot
conclude that the presence of a Claimant Attorney leads to a lower recovery for claimants
when a retired arbitrator serves as chair. As with professional arbitrators, this more
subtle conflict leads to more ambiguous results.
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4.6.

Regulatory Experience

Our final set of tests looks at the effect of an arbitrator’s experience as a regulator
on their awards. Our hypothesis is that arbitrators with prior government experience are
likely to give more credence to claims of broker misconduct and/or see greater need to
deter such misconduct through larger awards. To assess this possibility, we create an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator has experience as a federal or state
prosecutor, federal or state securities regulator, a prior affiliation with a self-regulatory
organization, or employment as a compliance officer with a broker-dealer, and 0
otherwise. We include compliance officers within our definition of regulator on the
theory that they play a quasi-regulatory role within brokerage firms.
In our earlier tests, we focused only on public arbitrators. For this set of tests, we
expand our scrutiny to also include the industry arbitrator. We postulate that industry
arbitrators with a regulatory background or who have played a compliance role within
their firm may have a lower tolerance for “bad apples” within the industry. Table 9
shows the incidence of experience as a regulator among our three groups.
<<Insert Table 9 About Here>>
Regulatory experience is relatively common among the arbitrators in our sample,
especially for industry arbitrators. Among the chairs, 17% had regulatory experience,
while 13% of the other public arbitrators had such experience. These numbers are far
outstripped by industry arbitrators: nearly half of that group had either regulatory or
compliance experience. Individuals are largely self-selected into the pool of available
arbitrators, so it is possible that industry members with regulatory or compliance
experience are more interested in the arbitration process.
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Without knowing the

breakdown for the overall pool of potential industry participants, however, we can only
speculate in this regard.
To test the effect of regulatory experience among arbitrators on the level of
awards, we estimate the following equation for each award using ordinary least squares
and robust standard errors clustered by arbitrator:
Compensation Ratioi = α + ß1iRegulator_Chairi + ß2iRegulator_Paneli +
ß3iClaimant Attorneyi + ß4iRespondent Attorneyi + ∑ßji Subject Matterji +
∑ßkiOpinion Controlski + ∑ßliState Controlsli + Year Effects + εi
We present the results in Table 10.
<<Insert Table 10 About Here>>
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find in Model 1 that the coefficients for
Regulator Chair and Regulator Panel are both positive, although only the latter is
significant (at the ten percent level). We see in Model 2 that when both public arbitrators
have regulatory experience, the effect is considerably more pronounced, with a much
larger positive coefficient, which is significant at the one percent level.
In our prior analyses, we assessed the interaction of the presence of an attorney
for the claimant with the arbitrator background characteristic of interest. For this set of
regressions, however, we are interested to see if the presence of an attorney for the
respondent mitigates the tendency of public arbitrators with regulatory experience to give
larger awards.67 In Model 3 of Table 10 we add interaction variables for Respondent
Attorney and the Regulator Chair and Regulator Panel indicator variables.

The

coefficient for Regulator Chair is insignificant in this model, as is the sum of that variable
and Regulator Chair x Respondent Attorney.

67

Similarly, the coefficient for Regulator

Importantly, as discussed above, the presence of a plaintiffs’ attorney may be a proxy for case quality;
the presence of a respondent attorney is less likely to correlate with case quality.
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Panel is insignificant in this model, as is the sum of that variable and Regulator Panel x
Respondent Attorney. Thus, we do not find substantial evidence that the presence of an
attorney for the respondent mitigates this effect.68
We also assess the effect of industry arbitrators with regulatory experience,
substituting Regulator Industry for the two public arbitrator variables used in the model
above. We present the results in Table 11.
<<Insert Table 11 About Here>>
We see in Model 1 that the coefficient for Regulator Industry is positive, but
small in magnitude and insignificant. Given the small magnitude of the coefficient, we
decided to re-estimate the model two different ways. First, we estimated the model with
an interaction variable, Regulator Industry x Respondent Attorney, similar to Model 3 in
Table 10. Both Regulator Industry and the interaction variable were insignificant in this
model, which we have not tabulated. We then re-estimated the model with an interaction
variable, Regulator Industry x Claimant Attorney. Our rationale for doing so was that
claimant attorneys may play a role in identifying industry arbitrators who were more
likely to be generous to claimants. We present the results of this regression in Model 2 of
Table 11. We see that the coefficient for Regulator Industry is negative in this estimation
and significant at the five percent level. The coefficient for the variable interacting
Regulator Industry with Claimant Attorney is positive, also significant at the five percent
level. The sum of the two is not significantly different from zero. These finding suggest

68

We re-estimated the models of Table 10 with replacing Regulator Industry with an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the arbitrator has experience as a federal or state prosecutor, federal or state securities
regulator, or a prior affiliation with a self-regulatory organization and 0 otherwise (excluding compliance
officers). Unreported we get the same qualitative results as in Table 10.
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that industry arbitrators tend to make lower awards only when claimants are not
represented by counsel.

5.

CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, the background of an arbitrator would not influence the

outcome in arbitration. Each arbitrator would set aside his or her prior experiences and
biases and rule impartially. The reality, however, is that securities arbitration is not an
ideal world. FINRA has recognized the importance of an arbitrator’s background in its
increasingly stringent qualification requirements.
In this study we examine the relationship between an arbitrator’s background and
the outcome in securities arbitration. For the public arbitrators, we find that industry
experience and status as a professional arbitrator are correlated with statistically
significant decreases in arbitration awards. This decrease, however, is tempered when
claimant is represented by counsel. We also find that prior experience as a regulator for
the public arbitrators is correlated with a statistically significant increase in arbitration
awards. We do not find substantial evidence that the presence of an attorney for the
respondent mitigates this effect. Turning to the industry arbitrator, we find that industry
arbitrators with regulatory experience correlate with a statistically significant decrease in
arbitration awards.

This effect, however, is mitigated when the claimants have an

attorney.
Our findings have important implications for how FINRA regulates arbitrator
background into the future. Our most consistent finding is that representation by counsel
can reduce or eliminate the effect of arbitration background on arbitration outcomes.
Supporters of arbitration often highlight its streamlined proceedings and lower costs
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compared to litigation as an advantage for small claimants. Our findings suggest that,
even with streamlined procedures, claimants who lack attorneys are disadvantaged.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable
Compensation Ratio

Definition
The total amount of compensation award divided by the
claimed compensation amount.

Subject Matter Controls
Suitability

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved a
suitability claim, including claims involving “know your
customer,” NYSE Rule 405, and NASD Rule 2310
issues, and 0 otherwise.

Churning

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved a
churning, excessive trading, or excessive commission
claim and 0 otherwise.

Unauthorized Trades

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved an
unauthorized trading claim and 0 otherwise.

Failure to Execute

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved a
claim that the broker or brokerage firm failed to execute a
transaction, failed to monitor an account properly,
improperly executed a transaction, or engaged in
activities that resulted in errors in a customer account and
0 otherwise.

Misrepresentation

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved
misrepresentation, fraud, failure to disclose, Rule 10b-5,
common law fraud, or deceptive sales tactic claim and 0
otherwise.

Conversion

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved a
theft, conversion, unauthorized withdrawals, or selfdealing claim and 0 otherwise.

Reported Settlement

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration resulted in a
full or partial settlement and the settlement amount was
reported and 0 otherwise.

Unreported Partial Settlement Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration resulted in a
partial settlement and the settlement amount was not
reported (but the award for the non-settling respondents
was reported) and 0 otherwise.
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Opinion Controls
Claimed Compensation

Amount of claimed compensation in dollars by the
arbitration claimants.

Inexperienced

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the award is from the first
year the arbitrator appears in the dataset and 0 otherwise.

Top Accused Brokerage

Indicator Variable equal to 1 if any of the responedents
was one of the top 10 brokerage firms of 1998.

Respondent Failed to Appear

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the any of the respondents
failed to appear at the arbitration hearing and 0 otherwise.

Claimed Punitive Damages

Indicator variable equal to 1 if punitive damages were
imposed on any of the respondents in the arbitration
award and 0 otherwise.

Claimed CRD Expungement

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CRD records of any of
the respondent-brokers was expunged and 0 otherwise.

Number of Hearings

Number of hearings for the arbitration.

Opinion Length

Number of pages in the award opinion.

Arbitrator Background
Securities Experience

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator’s primary
career experience was in the securities industry or the
arbitrator had worked for a securities firm within the last
five years, and 0 otherwise.

Professional Arbitrator

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator primarily
works as arbitrator or is self-employed and 0 otherwise.

Retired

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator is retired or
over age 65 at the time of arbitration and 0 otherwise.

Regulator

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator has
experience as a federal or state prosecutor, federal or state
securities regulator, experience with a self-regulatory
organization, or a compliance officer with a brokerdealer, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 1. Arbitrations by Year
Year

Freq.

Percent

1998

149

35.7

1999

134

32.1

2000

134

32.1

Total

417

100.0
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable
Award ($ Thousands)
Compensation Ratio
Claimant Attorney
Respondent Attorney
Suitability
Churning
Unauthorized Trades
Failure to Execute
Misrepresentation
Conversion
Reported Settlement
Unreported Partial Settlement
Claimed Compensation ($ millions)
Inexperienced
Top Accused Brokerage
Respondent Failed to Appear
Claimed Punitive Damages
Claimed CRD Expungement
Number of Hearings
Opinion Length
New York
California
Florida

N

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

405
405
405
405
405
405
405
405
405
405
405
405
382
405
405
405
405
405
405
405
405
405
405

58.0
0.379
0.867
0.822
0.469
0.205
0.328
0.170
0.724
0.037
0.005
0.049
0.291
0.111
0.094
0.225
0.309
0.148
5.447
4.630
0.146
0.235
0.111

15.8
0.222
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.090
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
4.000
4.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

125.8
0.407
0.340
0.383
0.500
0.404
0.470
0.376
0.448
0.189
0.070
0.217
0.849
0.315
0.292
0.418
0.463
0.356
4.228
1.150
0.353
0.424
0.315
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Table 3. Industry Experience for Public Arbitrators
N
Chair

290

Fraction with
Securities
Experience
0.200

Panel

275

0.193

Table 4. Industry Experience Regressions
(1)
Securities Experience Chair
-0.412
(-0.46)
Securities Experience Panel

(2)

-4.558**
(-2.71)

-0.553
(-0.81)

Securities Experience Both

(3)
-1.309
(-0.45)

-5.463
(-1.25)

Claimant Attorney

0.929
(1.18)

1.006
(1.23)

-0.346
(-0.39)

Respondent Attorney

-2.031+
(-1.77)

-1.922+
(-1.72)

-1.689
(-1.51)

Securities Experience Chair
* Claimant Attorney

1.056
(0.34)

Securities Experience Panel
* Claimant Attorney

4.989*
(2.60)

Constant

-0.500
-0.767
0.120
(-0.24)
(-0.38)
(0.06)
N
186
186
186
Adj. R2
0.324
0.327
0.341
Subject Matter Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Opinion Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
State Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the compensation ratio. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 5. Professional Arbitrators
N
Chair

344

Fraction
Professional
Arbitrators
0.346

Panel

305

0.246

Table 6. Professional Arbitrator Regressions
(1)
Professional Arbitrator Chair
0.437
(0.81)
Professional Arbitrator Panel

(2)

-1.191*
(-2.09)

(3)
-0.863
(-0.55)
-1.487
(-0.89)

-1.254+
(-1.81)

Professional Arbitrator Both
Claimant Attorney

1.414+
(1.84)

1.329+
(1.73)

0.731
(0.69)

Respondent Attorney

-2.189*
(-2.44)

-2.129*
(-2.39)

-2.296*
(-2.48)

Professional Arbitrator Chair
* Claimant Attorney

1.541
(0.93)

Professional Arbitrator Panel
* Claimant Attorney

0.413
(0.23)

Constant

-1.619
-1.123
-0.930
(-0.93)
(-0.66)
(-0.50)
N
239
239
239
Adj. R2
0.323
0.320
0.322
Subject Matter Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Opinion Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
State Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the compensation ratio. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 7. Retired Arbitrators
N

Fraction
Retired

Chair

295

0.325

Panel

295

0.522

Table 8. Retired Arbitrator Regressions
Retired Chair
Retired Panel

(1)
-0.931+
(-1.87)

(2)

0.457
(0.98)

(3)
0.139
(0.10)
0.231
(0.19)

-0.985+
(-1.76)

Retired Both
Claimant Attorney

1.429*
(2.07)

1.608*
(2.33)

1.680
(1.60)

Respondent Attorney

-1.530+
(-1.67)

-1.331
(-1.42)

-1.563+
(-1.69)

Retired Chair
* Claimant Attorney

-1.244
(-0.87)

Retired Panel
* Claimant Attorney

0.277
(0.21)

Constant

-2.655
-2.613
-2.770
(-1.63)
(-1.60)
(-1.60)
N
266
266
266
Adj. R2
0.307
0.305
0.304
Subject Matter Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Opinion Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
State Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the compensation ratio. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 9. Regulatory Experience for Public and Industry Arbitrators
N
Fraction
Regulators
Chair
290
0.166
Panel

275

0.131

Industry

257

0.463

Table 10. Regulatory Experience Public Arbitrator Regressions
(1)
(2)

(3)

Regulator Chair

1.071
(1.32)

0.666
(0.28)

Regulator Panel

1.364+
(1.69)

1.435
(0.58)
6.110**
(2.90)

Regulator Both
Claimant Attorney

0.998
(1.24)

0.930
(1.17)

1.007
(1.23)

Respondent Attorney

-2.014+
(-1.80)

-1.973+
(-1.78)

-2.024
(-1.65)

Regulator Chair
* Respondent Attorney

0.439
(0.17)

Regulator Panel
* Respondent Attorney

-0.097
(-0.04)

Constant

-0.875
-0.349
-0.930
(-0.45)
(-0.17)
(-0.44)
N
186
186
186
Adj. R2
0.335
0.333
0.327
Subject Matter Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Opinion Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
State Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the compensation ratio. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 11. Regulatory Experience Industry Arbitrator Regressions
(1)
(2)
Regulator Industry
0.091
-2.690*
(0.19)
(-2.04)
Claimant Attorney

0.899
(1.14)

-0.684
(-0.59)

Respondent Attorney

-0.469
(-0.51)

-0.712
(-0.77)
3.235*
(2.25)

Regulator Industry
x Claimant Attorney

-4.184*
-2.793
(-2.47)
(-1.48)
N
234
234
Adj. R2
0.235
0.249
Subject Matter Controls
Yes
Yes
Opinion Controls
Yes
Yes
State Controls
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the compensation ratio. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.

Constant
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